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8.1  Introduction 
This paper reports on a set of international comparisons of how the German 
and the U.S. economies are affected by population aging. The purpose of the 
paper is to employ cross-national comparisons to learn about the microeco- 
nomic mechanisms in labor, financial, and housing markets that are most im- 
portant for an analysis of how population  aging affects our economies  and, 
from an understanding of these mechanisms, to discuss policy options that may 
moderate  the  implications  of  population  aging.  The paper  concentrates  on 
three microeconomic decisions: when to retire, how much to save, and where 
to live. The paper is a continuation of Borsch-Supan (1991b). For a more mac- 
roeconomic view, the reader is referred to the many comparative studies that 
describe cross-national differences in the aging process and analyze aggregate 
economic implications (e.g., Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment  [OECD]  1988; Hagemann  and  Nicoletti  1989; Auerbach  et  al. 
1990). 
In order to discuss our policy options to alleviate negative implications of 
population aging on labor, financial, and housing markets, we must elucidate 
the economic mechanisms underlying retirement, savings, and housing choices 
by the elderly. In particular, we must understand how strongly they are affected 
by public policy, such as institutional arrangements, government regulations, 
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and laws. The main idea of this paper is to exploit international differences in 
public policy in order to learn about the responses by the elderly to these pol- 
icies. 
The power of an international comparison comes from the fact that different 
countries  have different  institutional  arrangements, government  regulations, 
subsidies, and laws. In a study of  only one country, it is often impossible to 
separate preferences from the impact of institutions and regulations, because 
there are commonly too few changes of  institutions  and  regulations  in one 
country to properly identify their impacts. Germany and the United States are 
particularly well suited for comparison. While they are sufficiently similar in 
mentality and social customs to make a comparison meaningful, they also fea- 
ture important  differences  in institutions  and public policy. I Moreover, Ger- 
many is one of the countries in which population aging is most advanced, lead- 
ing the aging process in the United States by  about 20 years. In this respect, 
changes that are occurring in Germany now may be indicative of changes to 
come in the United States. Indeed, retirement, savings, and housing behavior 
differ quite markedly between Germany and the United States, and I will show 
that most of these differences are consistent with the incentives applicable to 
each country. 
The paper proceeds  as follows. Section  8.2 summarizes  the basic  demo- 
graphic trends in Germany, contrasting it to the United States. Section 8.3 re- 
ports on retirement decisions, particularly early retirement and its causes. Sec- 
tion 8.4 is devoted to a descriptive analysis of the strikingly different savings 
patterns among the aged in the two countries. Housing markets are examined 
in section 8.5 with particular attention to the elderlys’ choice of living arrange- 
ments. Each of  these  sections provides a sketch of  the relevant  government 
regulations, evidence of how these square with actual behavior, and implica- 
tions for public policy. The paper concludes with a brief general summary. 
8.2  Basic Demographic Facts 
The expected change in the age structure of the industrialized countries is 
dramatic  and will  lead to  a substantially higher  proportion  of  older people. 
Population  aging  is  particularly  pronounced  in  Germany;  see  table  8.1  .2 
Among the seven large OECD countries, the aging process is least marked but 
1. On a more mundane yet important level. West Germany and the United States have rich and 
comparable longitudinal micro data sets that shed light on the economic situation of the elderly: 
the Panel Study of  Income Dynamics (PSID) and its German counterpart, the Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP). 
2. The numbers in this section are from OECD (1988) and refer to the former West Germany. 
Because East and West Germany have approximately the same age distributions, German unifica- 
tion  does not affect the  aging of the German population in  any substantial way. East Germany 
features a higher mortality rate and had a decade of higher fertility between the mid-seventies and 
reunification. Higher mortality is commonly attributed to environmental problems and insufficient 
health services in the former East Germany. It is likely to adjust quickly to West German mortality 
rates. The period of high fertility appears to have been caused by the omnipresent East German 293  Aging in Germany and the US.:  International Comparisons 
Table 8.1  Elderly Population in Seven OECD Countries 
Population Aged 80 
and Over 
(%o)  (millions) 
Population Aged 65 and Over 
1950  1990  2030  1980  2030 
Canada  1.7  11.4  22.4  0.44  1.89 
France  11.4  13.8  21.8  1.53  3.40 
Germany  9.4  15.5  25.8  1.60  2.65 
Italy  8.0  13.8  21.9  I .28  2.56 
Japan  5.2  11.4  20.0  I .63  6.64 
United Kingdom  10.7  15.1  19.2  1.48  2.60 
United States  8.  I  12.2  19.5  5.22  12.43 
Source: OECD (1988) 
still dramatic in the United Kingdom and the United States. Within the next 40 
years, the proportion of elderly in Germany will increase to more than a quarter 
of the population. Even more accentuated is the aging of households. The pro- 
portion of elderly households (headed by  persons over age 60) in the German 
population is projected  to increase from 21 percent in  1980 to 37 percent  in 
2030. Most marked  is the  increase among the oldest old: in the year 2030, 
Germany will have twice as many elderly over age 85 as now. 
Two distinct processes  are causing these dramatic changes. From  1950 to 
1980, life expectancy at birth increased by about 7.2 percent on average in the 
OECD, while fertility in the industrialized countries declined to below replace- 
ment  level;  see table 8.2. From  1950 to  1980, German  life  expectancy  in- 
creased by almost 7 years, from 66.4 to 73.3 years,3  while at the same time the 
fertility rate in West Germany decreased from 2.1 to 1.4, considerably below 
the reproduction  rate necessary  for a stable population. The effects of  both 
processes  sum to what is commonly termed “double aging” of  the industrial- 
ized countries. 
The effects of double aging on an economy are best captured by the old-age 
dependency ratio depicted in table 8.3. Again, the numbers for Germany are 
particularly dramatic. Its old-age dependency ratio will increase from 0.22 cur- 
rently to almost 0.44 in the year 2030. Therefore, in 2030, twice as many el- 
derly  aged 65 and above will have to be  supported by  the  same number of 
persons aged  15-64  as today. The projected German dependency ratio is the 
highest among all OECD countries except Swit~erland.~  The dependency ratio 
will fall again after 2030, when  the bulge of  the baby boom  works  its way 
child-care system, which used to support labor-force participation during the childbearing years 
of young women  (Chesnais 1987). This system was dismantled  after unification, and the East 
German fertility rate has dropped below the West German level. 
3. In 1985, life expectancy at birth was 71.5  years for German males, 78.1 years for German fe- 
males. 
4. The projected old-age dependency ratio for Switzerland in 2030 is 0.47. 294  Axel Borsch-Supan 








Life Expectancy$  Fertility Rateh 
1950  1980  Increase ('3%)  1950  1980  1980/1950  ('3%) 
68.4  75.0  9.6  3.4  I .8  52.9 
66.8  74.3  11.2  2.9  I .9  65.5 
66.4  73.3  10.4  2.1  I .4  66.7 
66.1  74.4  12.6  2.6  I .7  65.4 
59.2  76.4  29.1  2.4  I .8  75.0 
68.9  73.8  7.1  3.0  1.8  60.0 
68.4  73.5  7.5  2.2  I .8  81.8 
Source: OECD (I  988). 
"Average  life expectancy at birth in years. 
hAge-specific fertility rates summed across all child-bearing ages. 
Table 8.3  Old-Age Dependency Ratios for Seven OECD Countries 
Population Aged 65+iPopulation  Aged 15-64 
1980  1990  2000  2010  2020  2030 
Canada  14.  I  16.8  19.0  21.4  28.9  37.3 
France  21.9  20.9  23.3  24.5  30.6  35.8 
Germany  23.4  22.3  25.4  30.6  33.5  43.6 
Italy  20.8  20.  I  22.6  25.7  29.3  35.3 
Japan  13.5  16.2  22.6  29.5  33.6  31.9 
United Kingdom  23.2  23.0  22.3  22.3  25.5  31.1 
United States  17.1  18.5  18.2  18.8  25.0  31.7 
Source: OECD (1988) 
through  the age  distribution.  However,  it  is likely  to  remain  substantially 
higher than now: the OECD estimate for 2050 is 41.6 percent. 
The increase in the ratio of retirees to workers is even more accentuated than 
that in the demographic old-age dependency ratio. The retiree/worker ratio is 
closer to the economic meaning of an old-age dependency ratio but more dif- 
ficult to project because  of potential  changes in labor supply behavior. The 
German ministry of  labor affairs projects that this ratio will climb from 0.48 
currently to about 0.91 retirees per worker in the year 2030. 
The dependency ratios in table 8.3 show quite clearly how the double aging 
process will strain the pay-as-you-go social security systems of  our countries 
simply because fewer contributors will have to support more retirees. However, 
this is not the only policy problem facing the industrialized countries. Because 
the average age of  the work  force will increase, aggregate productivity  will 
decline, unless the hump-shaped age-productivity profile also shifts. Increas- 
ing the contribution rates to public pension systems will create work disincen- 295  Aging in Germany and the U.S.:  International Comparisons 
tives, exacerbating the potential productivity decline and partly offsetting the 
contribution increases. The double aging process will also change the accumu- 
lation of aggregate wealth and skew its intergenerational distribution in a com- 
plicated fashion, because older people save differently than younger people. It 
will assign a growing burden of family support to the young generation, when 
the elderly  become frail and  unable to live independently. These issues are 
taken up in the following sections. 
8.3  Retirement Decisions 
8.3.1  Institutional Background 
Germany and the United States have pay-as-you-go public pension systems, 
with the resulting sensitivity to shifts in the age distribution that is the focus of 
most debates about population aging. Both countries supply, in effect, a mini- 
mum level of retirement income to workers with little labor income. And both 
countries  feature fairly broad coverage of  workers by  social security:  in the 
United States, about 95 percent of all workers are insured by  Social Security, 
including the  self-employed, while in Germany only the  self-employed (8.9 
percent of  the labor force in  1988) and workers with very small incomes (5.6 
percent) are not covered (Casmir 1989). 
Apart from these similarities, Germany and the United States differ substan- 
tially in their retirement incentives. First, about a quarter of  the German labor 
force is subject to mandatory retirement. This includes the entire public sector 
and some private sectors. In most cases, the mandatory retirement age is 65 
years. In the United States, age discrimination laws prohibit mandatory retire- 
ment. Part-time work is also very restricted in Germany, because of inflexible 
work regulations and high fringe benefits, independent  of hours worked, sus- 
tained by an insider coalition of unions and employers. 
Second, although  in  both  countries  the  public  retirement  system  is  aug- 
mented by  private  pensions,  they play only a minor role in Germany, while 
they are a significant source of  retirement income in the United States. About 
half of the American elderly aged 60 and above are covered by pension plans. 
For  13 percent  of  these, pensions  contribute  more than  20 percent  of  their 
incomes, for 2 percent, more than half their retirement incomes (Hurd  1989, 
table I1 6). This is in striking contrast to Germany. In  1984, 82 percent of all 
elderly in West Germany  received  only social security income. Another  8.5 
percent have additional private pension income (mainly annuities from life in- 
surance), and only 7.6 percent have both social security and firm pension in- 
come.5 The difference in the importance of private pension plans is most strik- 
ing when  the average contribution  of  firm pensions to retirement  income is 
5.  According to the  1984 wave of  the German SOEP. 296  Axel Borsch-Supan 
considered: Private pensions contribute about 15 percent of the income of the 
American elderly, but only slightly more than 3 percent for the German elderly. 
Not only the significance but also the pattern of  private  pension  plans is 
different.  The United  States  features  a  broad  range  of  pension  provisions 
among firms even within the same industry (Kotlikoff and Wise 1987), while 
pension plans are rather homogeneous in Germany (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 
1987). The main reason for the homogeneity in Germany is the centralization 
of union activities: all unionized employees in a German industry are members 
of the same union, and labor contracts also apply for nonunion members of the 
same industry. 
A third difference between the social security systems in the United States 
and Germany is the general level of  public retirement income. In the United 
States, Social Security is tailored to prevent poverty among the elderly and to 
secure a minimum reasonable standard of living. In Germany, public pensions 
are essentially proportional to lifetime earnings, because they are intended to 
ensure approximately  the  same living standard before  and  after retirement. 
Hence, German public pensions provide for substantially higher replacement 
rates than their US. counterparts, particularly for higher income levels. As a 
matter of fact, the stated rationale for not having complete replacement in Ger- 
many is not the added utility of leisure but the cessation of work-related ex- 
penses after retirement. Only very high incomes are not subject to the propor- 
tionality rule, because the income subject to social security contributions  is 
capped. Table 8.4 presents net replacement ratios by income class, i.e., average 
after-tax retirement incomes as percentages of average after-tax labor incomes. 
On average, German  social security income is about 33 percent higher than 
American, resulting in an average net replacement ratio of  more than 70 per- 
cent.  This also implies  that  unbequeathable  and  intangible  social  security 
wealth is considerably higher in Germany than in the United States. This is, 
on average, only partially compensated by higher private pension wealth in the 
United States. 
Incentives with respect to retirement timing also differ between the United 
States and Germany. While  the  social  security  provisions  in both  countries 
offer the opportunity to retire at different ages (the so-called “window of re- 
tirement”),  they  differ  considerably  in  how  benefit  levels  are adjusted  for 
retirement  at  different  ages.  Table  8.5  displays  these  adjustments.  They 
relate retirement income for retirement at age 65 (normalized to 100 percent) 
to retirement  income at earlier or later retirement  ages and combine the re- 
duction  factors  for early  retirement  with  the  delayed  retirement  credit  for 
retirement  after full-benefit retirement  age. Currently,  full-benefit retirement 
age is 65 in both countries. It will remain so in Germany, while in the United 
States it will gradually increase to age 66 in the year 2005 and to age 67 in 
2022. 
The first column  in table 8.5 displays nondistortionary  adjustment  factors 297  Aging in Germany and the U.S.:  International  Comparisons 
Table 8.4  Replacement Ratios of Social Security Old Age Pensions 
Net Replacement Ratioh (%) 







61  67 
55  66 
53  71 
45  77 
41  75 
30  53 
Source: Casmir (1989) 
“s  a percentage of the wages of an average production  worker. 
hAverage after-tax pension divided by  average  after-tax labor income; 40 years  of  services as- 
sumed; married couple supplement not included. 
Table 8.5  Adjustment of Public Pensions by Retirement Age: Pension as a 
Percentage of Pension One Would Obtain by Retiring at Age 65 
Germany  United States 
“Fair” 












64.6  87.5‘ 
70.4  90.0‘ 
76.7  92.5‘ 
83.7  95.0’ 
91.4  97.5’ 
100.0  100.0 
109.6  109.9 
120.4  120.1 
132.5  123.0 
146.2  125.8 


































Sources: Frerich (1987); Casmir (1989);  Social Securiy Bulletin 46, no. 7 (July 1983). 
“Hypothetical  adjustments that  keep the present discounted value  of retirement benefits  minus 
contributions constant across all retirement ages between 60-70  at a 3.3 percent discount rate. 
hGesetzliche  Rentenversicherung until  1992. 
‘Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung after 1992 reform has been fully phased in. 
“Old  Age Social Security (OASDI) until  1983. 
‘Old Age Social Security (OASDI) after 1983 reform has been fully phased in. 
‘Applicable only to women and workers who cannot be appropriately employed due to health or 
mismatch reasons (berufs- oder erwerbsunfiihig). 
gApplicable only  to workers  who cannot be appropriately employed due to health  or mismatch 
reasons (berufs- oder etwerbsunfahig). 
hNot  yet eligible for Social Security benefits. 
‘Requires 35 years of service. 298  Axel Borsch-Supan 
which  I  dub “fair.”6 These adjustment  factors  keep the present  discounted 
value of retirement benefits minus contributions constant across all retirement 
ages between 60 and 70 and therefore do not distort the choice of retirement 
age, conditional on the fact that the worker has worked at least until age 59. I 
will use these adjustment factors as a yardstick for the current and the reformed 
relative pension benefits in the United States and Germany. 
In the  United  States, benefits  increase during the window  of  early retire- 
ment-ages  62-65-in  a way  that is reasonably close to actuarially fair. For 
retirement ages past 65, benefits increase less than actuarially fairly. The latest 
age to apply for an old-age pension is 70. 
In Germany, until  1992, benefits were proportional to years of service, with 
no further adjustment applied, resulting in a very small percentage increase in 
retirement benefits for postponing retirement once a large number of years in 
service is reached. The window period-effectively  ages 60-65-is  charac- 
terized by three regulations. First, everybody can retire at age 65. Second. in 
order to receive retirement benefits at age 63,35  years of service are necessary.’ 
Third, retirement at age 60 is possible for all women and for those male work- 
ers who cannot be appropriately employed (berufs- oder erwerbsunfahig) for 
health- or job-related reasons. The latter rule has been interpreted very broadly, 
and its application-loosely  speaking-required  only the help of  the family 
doctor. Its application was traditionally encouraged by employers who wanted 
to thin out their work forces. The rule also applies when there are no vacancies 
for the worker’s specific job description available, thereby fudging the distinc- 
tion between unemployment and retirements8 
In both countries, social security was reformed  to steepen the adjustment 
rate profiles. In the United States, the reduction factors for retirement before 
age 65 are now very close to actuarially fair. For retirement past age 65, bene- 
fits increase faster than under the old law, but the increase remains less than 
actuarially fair. The reformed German system provides substantially more in- 
centives for later retirement than does the American one. However, the reduced 
benefits for retirement before age 65 are still substantially higher than the non- 
distortionary ones in the first column of table 8.5. 
Although not completely free of distortive incentives, the American public 
retirement system is more age neutral during the window period than the Ger- 
man system. Particularly in the reformed U.S. system, there is little economic 
6. This term is somewhat misleading because the system as a whole is not actuarially fair. The 
present discounted values were computed for a discount rate of 3.3  percent, the value which would 
equalize lifetime  discounted  benefits and contributions  for the historical contribution rates and 
current life expectancy. 
7. This includes  time spent in  military  service,  on education, for  childbearing  (about  one 
year), etc. 
8. In the years between 1984 and  1989, Germany reduced the retirement age de facto to age 58 
(Vorruhestandsregelung) because workers could  apply for the  status berufsunfuhig  at  that age. 
They received unemployment compensation at ages 58 and 59 and then a social security pension 
as if they had retired at age 60. 299  Aging in Germany and the US.: International Comparisons 
incentive for Americans to retire at any particular age in the window of early 
retirement and only a small disincentive to retire later than at age 65, while the 
German social security system tilts the retirement decision heavily toward the 
applicable early retirement  date. Strangely  enough, the old  German  system 
provided a large increase in retirement benefits for work at ages 66 and 67. 
However, this reward was too small to offset the early retirement  incentives 
(see below). 
The tax treatment  of  labor earnings  while receiving  public pensions  also 
differs strongly between  the two countries. In the United States, receiving a 
public pension does not preclude  working, although additional labor income 
during  the entire window  period  of  ages 60-70  is taxed at 50 percent  if  it 
exceeds certain limits. In Germany, labor income, additional to a public pen- 
sion, which exceeds a very small allowance is taxed at 100 percent during the 
early retirement period. However, there is no penalty at all for working after 
age 65. 
All differences between the public and private pension  systems in the two 
countries-mandatory  retirement  age, the role  of  private pensions,  replace- 
ment levels, adjustment  factors of public pensions,  and taxation of labor in- 
come while receiving public pensions-are  likely to generate similar implica- 
tions  for  retirement  choices.  If  retirement  choices  respond  at  all  to  the 
economic incentives provided  by  public and private pension  plans, they are 
likely to be more uniform in Germany, while they should be more diverse in the 
United States, i.e., more individual specific and more firm specific. Moreover, 
because retirement income in Germany is on average higher than in the United 
States and because the German system is less than actuarially fair for late retir- 
ees, we should observe a lower supply of labor in old age in Germany than in 
the United States-provided  that the preference for leisure is roughly compa- 
rable in the two countries. 
8.3.2 
Indeed, this is what we find in a first glance at the data. Table 8.6 presents 
labor-force participation trends in seven OECD countries. The differences be- 
tween  Germany and the United  States are striking. Although both countries 
have experienced a declining  trend  in retirement  age (similar to that in the 
other OECD countries), labor-force participation of the elderly is substantially 
lower in West Germany than in the United  state^.^ In the United States, labor- 
force participation among persons aged 65 and over has fallen from 26.6 per- 
cent in  1965 to 10.3 percent in  1985. While in West Germany 24 percent of 
the elderly  still had a job in  1965, this percentage  has fallen to a mere  5.2 
percent  in  1985. This  participation  rate  is  the  lowest  in  the  seven  major 
OECD countries. 
The trend visible in table 8.6 is approximately  in line with changes in the 
Descriptive Evidence: Old-Age Labor Supply 
9.  Since I use pre-1990 data, I refer to West Germany only. 300  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 8.6  Labor-Force Participation Rates among Persons Aged 65 and Over 
(%o) 
I965  1975  1985 
Canada  26.3  18.5  12.3 
France  28.3  13.9  5.3 
Germany  24.0  10.8  5.2 
Italy  18.4  10.4  8.9 
Japan  56.3  44.4  37.0 
United Kingdom  23.7  15.8  1.6 
United States  26.6  20.7  10.3 
Suurce: OECD (1988). 
ratio of  retirement  to labor income.  In the United States as well as in West 
Germany, social security retirement income has increased relative to labor in- 
come. While nominal wages have increased 3.7-fold in the United States and 
4.1-fold  in West Germany, the average old-age social security  benefits have 
increased 4.6-fold in the United States and 4.3-fold in West Germany.'" This 
increase  of  pension  income  relative  to labor income  is due to the effective 
indexation of social security benefits in both countries. In West Germany, for 
example, pension  benefits  have been linked to gross average labor income." 
Retirement income is taxed at a much lower rate than labor income because of 
the generous exemptions. Hence, the progressivity of the income tax schedule 
has produced a more than proportional increase of  net retirement income rela- 
tive to the increase of net labor income. 
Cross-national  survey data provide additional evidence that economic fac- 
tors have strongly influenced old-age labor supply behavior. Table 8.7 presents 
a closer look at retirement  rates for male workers in West Germany and the 
United States, based on the 1984  wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID)  and its  German counterpart,  the  1984 wave of  the  Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP). Because incentives for part-time work are rather different in the 
two countries, it is important to define retirement consistently  and to distin- 
guish full retirement from partial and no retirement. We define retirement by 
hours worked and use three states of labor-force participation. Full-time work 
is 35 hours or more per week, part-time work is between  15 and 34 weekly 
hours, and full retirement is less than 15 hours of  work per week. 
The range of retirement ages is much wider in the United States than in West 
Germany. While the United States features a smooth transition between work 
and retirement, with a large percentage  of part-time work, the West German 
10. The numbers are obtained from Statistical Abstracts of  the  United Stares (Slatistical Ab- 
stract, various issues) and the Statistisches Jahrbucher fur die Bundesrepublik Deurschland (Stat- 
istisches Jahrbuch, various issues). 
11. The  1992 social  security  reform  has changed  this  to  an  indexation  with  respect to  net 
income. 301  Aging in Germany and the U.S.: International Comparisons 
Table 8.7  Male Retirement and Labor-Force Participation Rates (%) 
United States  West Germany 
Age  Full-Time  Part-Time  Retired  Full-Time  Part-Time  Retired 
50-54  76.6  11.0  12.4  91.5  0.6  7.8 
55-59  65.9  17.4  16.7  79.1  1.5  19.4 
60-64  38.8  16.9  44.3  37.7  1.6  60.8 
65-69  12.2  22.3  65.4  4.1  7.5  88.4 
70-74  7.2  13.7  79.1  1.7  3.2  95.3 
75-79  2.5  12.7  84.8  2.5  1.7  95.7 
80 +  1.6  4.8  93.5  1.2  0.0  98.8 
Sources:  1984 PSID; 1984 SOEP. 
Notes: Full-time: More than 35 weekly work hours. Part-time: Between  15 and 35 weekly work 
hours. Retired: Less than  15 weekly work hours. 
age-retirement profile is characterized by  a sudden jump from full-time work 
to full-time retirement in the age range 60-64,  accompanied by  a rather low 
percentage  of  part-time occupation. More detailed analysis shows that in the 
United States retirement ages are more evenly distributed, with a peak at age 
62. This is consistent with the fact that the adjustment of benefits in the United 
States is approximately  actuarially fair. We observe that in the United States 
people retire at all ages, most notably also at ages 63 and 64 in the interior of 
the window period. This is quite different from Germany. Here, retirement is 
very much concentrated at ages 60, 63, and 65, at exactly the first years when 
each of the three retirement regulations mentioned in subsection 8.3.2 apply, 
and very few people retire at ages between these. 
In order to turn these pieces of suggestive evidence into numbers which can 
be employed for policy analysis, I employ a simplified version of  the option 
value model developed by  Stock and Wise (1990). It relates  applicable eco- 
nomic  incentives-mainly  the  replacement  rate  and  the  retirement-age- 
dependent adjustment  factors-to  observed  retirement  age, conditional  on 
other determinants  of  retirement  behavior,  such  as sociodemographics  and 
health. Its key variable capturing economic incentives is the value of the option 
to postpone retirement at a given age. It is defined as the maximum attainable 
expected discounted utility from consumption if the worker were to retire at 
some later age minus the expected  discounted utility  if the worker were  to 
retire now (Lazear and Moore 1988). 
The consumption possibilities entering the option value are computed using 
the applicable pension rules. In Germany, the public pension system dominates 
retirement income. Therefore, economic retirement incentives are rather well 
captured by the replacement rates of the public pension system from table 8.4 
together with the retirement-age-dependent adjustment factors from table 8.5. 
In the United States, private pension plans may dominate the importance of 
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the United States give little information on the structure of each private pen- 
sion plan that may be applicable to each individual worker. I will therefore not 
attempt to make parallel analyses for the United States and Germany. 
The detailed construction of the model and estimation results are presented 
in Borsch-Supan (1992a). In essence, I estimate a logit model, regressing the 
probability of  being retired on  the option value, the sociodemographic  vari- 
ables, the health variables, and a set of age-specific constants for each age in 
the window period. The main results can be summarized as follows: the model 
fits the data rather well, the option value is statistically highly significant, and 
the age-specific constants remain insignificant. These are strong findings be- 
cause they imply that, during the main window of retirement, actual behavior is 
well described by the option value, the main economic incentive for retirement. 
These estimation results can be used in a microsimulation model to predict 
retirement ages under alternative social security rules. Specifically, I replace 
each person’s actual option value by the option value computed with alternative 
retirement-age-dependent  adjustment factors. The baseline retirement  proba- 
bilities are fitted to replicate the population retirement probabilities. I therefore 
project all other determinants of retirement timing not included in the explana- 
tory variables into the future, particularly preferences  and social customs. In 
this respect, I am likely to underestimate  the total effects of  the  simulated 
social security changes. 
Table 8.8 summarizes  the microsimulation  results  in form of  the average 
retirement age and required contribution rates. From the number of pensioners 
implied by  the simulation results, I compute the average retirement  age and 
the ratio of pensioners to employed persons. Using the pay-as-you-go budget 
equation of the social security system, I then calculate the social security con- 
tribution rates necessary to balance contributions and payments for the years 
1990 and  2000. The first row  of  table  8.8 relates to the old German social 
security system, as it was in place until 1992.  The second row presents simula- 
tion results for the German social security system, employing the adjustment 
factors of the  1992 reform. Finally, the third row displays results for a “fair” 
system using the nondistortionary adjustment factors of column 1 in table 8.5. 
Taking the  1992 social security reform into account removes  some but by 
no means all of the distortion toward early retirement in Germany. The propor- 
tion of  the population retiring before age 60 drops from 32.2 percent to 28.4 
percent, in 1990, and the average retirement age increases by about half a year. 
As a consequence, the contribution rates necessary for a balanced budget are 
18.1 percent rather than 18.7 percent, in 1990, and are 19.5  percent rather than 
20.1 percent, in 2000. 
However,  a  system  with  nondistortionary  adjustment  factors,  as  defined 
above, has a much stronger effect on retirement age and also therefore on the 
contribution rate necessary to balance the public pension system’s budget. It 
increases the average retirement age by about two years and results in contribu- 
tion rates that are substantially lower (by more than two percent) than the ones 
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Table 8.8  Simulated Average Retirement Age and Contribution Rates 
Contribution Rate 
(%I 
Mean Retirement Age  1990  2000 
System before 1992 reform 
System after 1992 reform 
Nondistortionary (“fair”) system 
58.5  18.7  20.1 
59.0  18.1  19.5 
60.7  16.2  17.4 
Source: Author’s calculations 
8.3.3  Policy Implications 
The main conclusion from the evidence presented is the strong and consis- 
tent response of retirement behavior to public policy. The differences in retire- 
ment behavior between Germany and the United States are clearly in line with 
economic incentives to retirement  in each country and with the institutional 
differences between them. The fine tuning by retirement-age-dependent  bene- 
fit adjustments appears to be well reflected in observed choices of retirement 
ages. We learned that our pension systems indeed powerfully influence retire- 
ment decisions. 
In  principle,  an  individual  should be  able to  choose his  retirement  date. 
However, changes in the average retirement age have side effects on the sound- 
ness of the social security system, on average wages, on aggregate productivity, 
on tax revenues, and on aggregate savings. Advancing retirement ages amplify 
the effects  of  a rising  old-age  dependency ratio, potentially  above the eco- 
nomic potential and the will of a generation of workers to come. While this 
affects mainly  the public  pension  system, private pension  funds and health 
insurance  systems are also affected because health insurance  for retirees  is 
heavily subsidized in Germany and in the United States. The increase in the 
general support ratio will lead to a level of  social security and general taxes 
that will create strong work disincentives. In West Germany, Schmahl (1989) 
projected social security contribution rates exceeding 40 percent of gross labor 
income, not including rising general taxes to finance added health expendi- 
tures. Such high tax rates are simply not sustainable. Although this effect has 
been  the focus of  most  debates  about  population  aging  and has led to the 
above-mentioned social security reforms in Germany and in the United States, 
our simulation  shows that this  lesson has not  yet been  learned  in Germany 
because the  1992 social security reform has not really removed early retire- 
ment incentives. 
Replacing the strong incentives for German workers to retire early by a more 
age-neutral system appears likely to generate more evenly distributed retire- 
ment ages than those depicted in table 8.7. As a way to induce later retirement, 
a gradual  adjustment of replacement rates  may be not only more subtle but 
also more  efficient  than the  shift of  eligibility  ages that  was enacted in the 
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because it avoids the bunching that is a current characteristic of German retire- 
ment behavior and that appears to be an expression of constraints imposed on 
retirement choices. 
Changing the retirement system too late will be complicated by  the change 
in the politics of the social security system. Political power will shift from the 
working population, where it now resides, to the older generation, along with 
the surge in the dependency ratio. In West Germany, for example, from about 
2020 onward, the majority of the voters will be pensioners and workers who 
will retire within the next 10 years. We then obtain a typical free-rider situation 
because the older generation can outvote the younger generation in determin- 
ing  their  retirement  income as well  as the  rate of  social  security  taxes  the 
younger generation has to pay. 
8.4  Savings Behavior 
8.4.1  Historical and Institutional Background 
American and German attitudes toward saving are very different. Germans 
have traditionally valued saving per se and were reluctant to follow American 
consumerism, despite the strong American influence on German postwar de- 
velopment. Although this attitude appears to be changing with each new gener- 
ation, it changes surprisingly slowly. Table 8.9 presents comparable personal 
savings rates for the two countries. Savings rates have always been higher in 
Germany than in the United States, but the discrepancy has been particularly 
large in recent years. Although both countries have experienced declining sav- 
ings rates since 1975, the relative decline is much larger in the United States. 
The different historical experiences of Germans and Americans may help 
explain the higher aggregate savings rates that emerged in Germany as soon as 
a moderate standard of living was achieved in the 1960s. The elderly in this 
decade all experienced World War 11. This catastrophe, however, has affected 
Americans  and Germans very differently.  During the war and until the Ger- 
many currency reform in 1948, most Germans could not even satisfy their ba- 
sic need for food and clothing. This experience was not shared by their Ameri- 
can contemporaries. In addition, during the so-called economic miracle in the 
1950s in Germany, saving was heavily  promoted  in large-scale  public cam- 
paigns. 
The attitude that saving is good per se (and that personal loans are something 
to be avoided) is reflected in the German tax treatment of savings and loans. 
There are  several  schemes subsidizing  savings in  Germany, many  of  them 
heavily advertised. And taxation of  interest income is only half-heartedly en- 
forced. 
On paper, asset income, including capital gains, is taxed as ordinary income. 
Income from stocks and bonds is subject to automatic 25 percent withholding, 
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Table 8.9  Aggregate Savings Rates (%) 
Year  West Germany  United States 
1960  8.6  5.1 
1965  12.2  7.0 
1970  13.8  8.0 
1915  16.2  8.7 
1980  14.2  7.9 
I985  13.0  6.4 
1990  14.8  5.1 
Sources: Monarsberichte der Deurschen Bundesbunk (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank, 
various issues); Economic Report of  ?he President, Statistical Appendix (Washington, D.C.: Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1992). 
Nore: Table reports personal saving as percentage of personal disposable income. 
dends are subject to corporate income tax, this tax is credited against personal 
income taxes. Hence, Germany has no double taxation of dividend income as 
in the United States. Interest income from passbook savings and similar liquid 
capital is not currently subject to automatic withholding. Moreover, direct noti- 
fication of  the internal revenue service by the bank (as routinely done in the 
United States on form  1099) would be a violation of German privacy  laws. 
Although the government has stepped up its public relations effort to stimulate 
compliance with the tax code, interest income remains routinely undeclared. 
Finally, capital gains are only taxable when earned by “speculation.” The law 
considers the holding of financial assets to be speculative if the assets are sold 
within six months of purchase. For land, holding periods are speculative if they 
are shorter than two years. Long-run  capital gains therefore escape taxation 
in Germany. 
The German government has several special incentive programs to subsidize 
savings. A general program is designed to foster capital accumulation among 
the lower-income groups (Vermogensbildungsgesetz).  This program has been 
in place since 1961 and was substantially extended in the 1970s. Employees or 
pensioners deduct a certain amount from their incomes and direct deposit it in 
long-term  savings accounts. The government then  supplements the contribu- 
tions of eligible savers by  a fixed-percentage savings premium capped by  an 
upper limit. In the seventies, these premia were as high as 40 percent and the 
income limit for eligibility was high enough to cover incomes far into the mid- 
dle class. Currently, savings in productive capital are subsidized by a 20 per- 
cent savings premium, savings in real estate by  10 percent,  and the income 
limit is DM 54,000 per year for married couples, a lower middle-class income 
of about $33,000. 
Capital market institutions do not differ greatly between the United States 
and Germany. In both countries, financial markets are only mildly regulated, 
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well-to-do in the United States face more portfolio options than their German 
counterparts, because of a somewhat more dynamic U.S. market for financial 
instruments. Differences in savings options between Germany and the United 
States  mainly  include  different  dedicated  savings programs.  In  the  United 
States, IRAs and Keoghs are subsidized  savings dedicated  to retirement  in- 
come (Venti and Wise  1987); such programs do not exist in Germany. How- 
ever, bequeathable savings dedicated to housing investments are substantially 
subsidized  and play  a  major  role in  German  private  capital  accumulation 
(Borsch-Supan and Stahl 1991a). 
An  important  difference  in the institutional background  for savings deci- 
sions in the two countries is the extent of income maintenance by compulsory 
social security programs. This brings up the question of whether social security 
and private savings xe  substitutes, a topic of great interest and the subject of 
controversial discussions (Barro 1974; Feldstein  1974). Because one needs to 
observe differences in the extent of social security programs in order to meas- 
ure these potential substitution effects, an international perspective is helpful. 
As we have seen in table 8.4, social security income differs dramatically be- 
tween Germany  and the United  States. The German  old-age social  security 
system replaces net income across all income ranges much more generously 
than the U.S. social security system. The high average net replacement ratio of 
more than 70 percent may provide a sufficient level of retirement income for 
the elderly  and hence reduce the incentive for life-cycle savings in order to 
finance consumption in retirement. 
In addition, there are pronounced differences in the health insurance systems 
between the two countries. In Germany, all retirees are enrolled in the manda- 
tory  health insurance  system which covers all health expenditures, with the 
exception of long-term institutionalized care not related to acute illness. This 
coverage is far more comprehensive than that of Medicaid and Medicare in the 
United  States.  Therefore,  the  precautionary  savings  motive  to  safeguard 
against  unexpected  expenditures, particularly  health-care-related  expendi- 
tures, should be less pronounced in Germany. 
In summary, we receive a mixed message about the impact of institutions on 
savings. On one hand, tax treatment of savings is more favorable in Germany 
than  in  the  United  States, which  should, ceteris  paribus,  induce  relatively 
higher savings rates in Germany. On the other hand, two of the main economic 
rationales for saving-assuring  a comfortable retirement  income and taking 
precautions against high health expenses-are  less important in Germany than 
they  are in the United  States, because  the  safety  net is tighter in Germany. 
This should, ceteris paribus, reduce savings among households younger than 
retirement age. Among the older elderly, however, the tighter safety net in Ger- 
many  might actually increase net savings, since the generous retirement  in- 
come might not only prevent the German elderly from depleting their assets 
but even provide income levels sufficiently large to induce savings in old age. 
We will take up this point when we look at the evidence on savings behavior 
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8.4.2  Evidence on Savings Behavior among the Aged 
It is not straightforward to compare wealth data between the two countries. 
In both, the wealth distribution  is very  skewed. Average wealth is therefore 
sensitive to a few very wealthy persons, while median wealth is zero for most 
asset categories. I employ wealth data from the PSID and SOEP wealth supple- 
ments in 1984 and 1988. Response rates to these supplements were lower than 
to  the  core  questionnaire  (particularly  in  Germany),  and the quality  of  the 
wealth data is likely to be less reliable than other PSID and SOEP data, mainly 
because the wealth data is self-reported and subject to severe underreporting. 
However, the wealth data presented  is roughly comparable between  the two 
countries, because the PSID and SOEP wealth supplements are based on the 
same design principles. Valuation is complicated by the large discrepancy be- 
tween exchange rate and purchasing power in the mid-1980s. The average ex- 
change rate between the deutsche mark and the U.S. dollar was about $1 to 
DM 2.70, substantially higher than the average purchasing power parity, which 
was about $1 to DM 1.70, according to OECD figures. Because I am interested 
in real wealth, I use purchasing power parity. 
Table 8.10 displays tangible wealth by household, stratified by age catego- 
ries. The reported  values for the United States are in line with data from the 
American Retirement History Survey reported by Hurd (1989), which gives us 
some confidence in the data.I2 Total tangible household wealth is the sum of 
several asset categories reported in the two surveys. Financial wealth includes 
liquid wealth, such as passbook savings and money market mutual funds, dedi- 
cated savings, such as the above-mentioned IRA and Keogh accounts in the 
United  States and Bausparkussen (building  societies)  savings in West Ger- 
many, and stocks and bonds. Nonhousing  wealth is defined as the sum of fi- 
nancial wealth plus farm and business property plus real estate not including 
an owner-occupied home. The self-reported estimated sales value of an owner- 
occupied home is then added, to yield total tangible household wealth. 
In addition to the tangible wealth reported in table 8.10, almost all elderly 
persons have intangible and unbequeathable wealth, mainly social security and 
pension wealth. Total intangible wealth in the United States is estimated to be 
almost as large as the tangible wealth reported in table 8.10 (Hurd 1989), and 
it is even more in Germany. 
According to the PSID and SOEP data, total tangible household wealth is, 
on average across  ages 50 and  above, lower in  West  Germany  than  in  the 
United States. Valued by purchasing power, West German elderly households 
hold  roughly  20 percent less tangible  wealth than  American  elderly house- 
holds. However, this 20 percent lower level of tangible wealth in West Ger- 
many  corresponds  to a 33 percent higher  level of  intangible  social security 
wealth (according to the replacement ratios in table 8.5). The higher sum of 
tangible and intangible wealth in West Germany is a reflection  of the higher 
12. However, the Retirement History Survey data are subject to measurement problems similar 
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Table 8.10  Household Wealth by Age and Asset Category 








United States  West Germany 
Nonhousing  Own Housing  Total  Nonhousing  Own Housing  Total 
40.2  51.9  92.1  19.8  54.2  73.9 
47.1  48.2  95.3  29.8  43.4  73.2 
45.1  41.6  86.7  41.9  54.5  96.4 
37.8  38.8  76.6  35.0  36.8  71.8 
38.0  31.5  69.5  22.4  45.7  68.1 
41.3  34.3  75.6  31.4  28.7  60.1 
37.2  30.5  67.7  31.0  29.8  60.8 
Sources:  1984 PSID; 1988 SOEP at  1984 prices, valued at purchasing power parity  ($1 = DM 
1.70). 
Nores: Financial wealth includes passbook savings, money market mutual funds, dedicated savings 
(IRA, Keogh, Bausparkassen, etc.), stocks and bonds. Nonhousing wealth is financial wealth plus 
real estate (except an owner-occupied home), farm, and business property. Housing wealth is the 
estimated sales value of an owner-occupied home. All values are self-reported. 
aggregate savings rate depicted in table 8.9. The difference in wealth levels 
between the two countries is therefore consistent with Feldstein’s (1974) view 
that private wealth has, at least in part, been substituted for by social security 
wealth in West Germany. 
Another, although more indirect, piece of evidence in favor of the Feldstein 
view can be drawn  from data on income sources displayed in table 8.11. In 
West Germany, annuity income (almost exclusively social security income, as 
I noted in the discussion about the role of private pensions, in section 8.3) is 
the most important income source for all households  aged 60 and above. In 
turn, asset and labor income play a more important role in the United States. 
For very old Americans (aged 75 and above), income from assets contributes 
about  one-quarter  of  total income. Hurd  obtains similar results  based  on a 
much  larger  sample from the  American  Current  Population  Survey  (Hurd 
1989, table 15). 
Not only the levels of tangible and intangible wealth but also the age-wealth 
profiles  are different between  the  two countries,  as revealed by  table  8.10. 
While American  elderly have nonhousing  wealth levels that only slowly de- 
cline after age 55, the German age-wealth profile is irregularly shaped with a 
pronounced peak at ages 60-64  and a remarkable increase in financial wealth 
at very old ages. These observations are not in line with pure life-cycle theory 
predictions and deserve a more careful analysis than the PSID and SOEP data 
can provide. 
Wolff (1990) analyzes American wealth data, using the Survey of Consumer 
Finances and the Consumer Expenditure  Survey. His results show a similarly 
slow decline in wealth levels. Also, the German age-wealth profiles  are not 
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Table 8.11  Sources of Income (% of total income) 


































Labor  Annuities  Assets 
85.4  7.3  7.3 
76.5  14.4  9.0 
37.0  51.9  11.1 
4.1  87.0  8.9 
2.7  82.0  15.3 
0.6  81.8  17.6 
0.7  86.3  12.9 
Sources;  1984 PSID; 1984  SOEP. 
Nores: Labor includes  full-time and part-time wages. Annuity  income  includes social security, 
pensions, and other transfers. Asset income includes interests, dividends, rents, and profits. 
same pattern is also evident in the much larger sample of the German  1978 
and 1983 consumer expenditure surveys.” 
Tables 8.12 through 8.14 display results from these two surveys. Table 8.12 
reports on net household savings, defined as the sum of  all purchases of  assets 
minus the sum of  all sales of assets. These assets include financial assets and 
real estate, including owner-occupied housing. Changes in financial assets are 
deposits and withdrawals to and from all kinds of  savings accounts and pur- 
chases and sales of stocks and bonds, partnerships, and dedicated savings pro- 
grams (particularly to building societies). New loans are subtracted and repay- 
ments added to net savings. Not included  in savings are durables (other than 
housing), cash, and unrealized capital gains. 
Savings rates in table 8.13 are computed by dividing the above net house- 
hold savings by  household income net of taxes and social security contnbu- 
tions, if applicable. Finally, table 8.14 reports on financial wealth, defined as 
in table  8.10.l4 All  three tables are stratified by  survey year, age, and birth 
cohort. Cell sizes range from 776 to 4,343 observations, resulting in precise 
averages. The upper number refers to the 1978 German income and expendi- 
ture survey, the lower number to the survey conducted in 1983. 
Although it would be desirable to consider more than just two periods, the 
data permit a rough distinction between age and cohort effects. In particular, 
table 8.12 reveals  that  savings among the very old in Germany are not only 
positive,  but  actually  increase  with age, holding birth cohort constant.  This 
increase is even more pronounced in the savings rates (table 8.13) and gener- 
ates levels of financial wealth that are increasing with age (table 8.14). Since 
housing wealth stays virtually unchanged  as households age (see section 8.5 
13.  Einkommens- und Verbrauchstichproben; see Borsch-Supan and Stahl(l991 b) and Borsch- 
14.  It excludes business and farm property included in table 8.10. 
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Table 8.12  Household Savings by Age and Cohort, 1978 and 1983 (DM per year, 
in 1983 DM) 
~ 
Birth Cohort 
Age  1928-24  1923-1 9  19  18-1 3  I9 12-09  1908-04  <  1904 
50-54  5,136 
55-59  3,771  4,477 
60-64  2,468  2,830 
65-69  1,459  2,450 
70-74  2,016  2,368 
75-79  2,501  3,7 I7 
80 +  4,015 
Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchstichproben (EVS) tapes (Stuttgart: Statistisches Bundesamt, 
1978, 1983). 
Table 8.13  Saving Rates by Age and Cohort, 1978 and 1983 (net household 
savingdnet household income) 
Birth Cohort 
Age  1928-24  1923-19  1918-13  1912-09  1908-04  <1904 
5  0-5  4  7.3 
55-59  5.3  7  .O 
60-64  3.5  3.8 





4.1  4.8 
5.8  8.8 
9.7 
Source: EVS tapes (Stuttgart: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1978, 1983). 
Notes: Age is age of  household head. In each column, the upper number refers to  1978, the lower 
number to 1983. 
Table 8.14  Financial Wealth by Age and Cohort, 1978 and 1983 (thousand DM, 
in 1983 DM) 
Birth Cohort 
Age  1928-24  1923-1 9  191  8-1  3  191  2-09  1908-04  <  1904 
50-54  26.5 
55-59  27.1  28.3 
60-64  28.9  27.5 
65-69  27.5  25.8 
70-74  28.7  26.5 
75-79  28.7  30.3 
80+  31.9 
Source: EVS tapes (Stuttgart: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1978, 1983). 
Notes: Age is age of household head. In each column, the upper number refers to 1978,  the lower 
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on housing), the German data feature a flat, if not increasing, age profile of 
total wealth. Borsch-Supan (1992) shows that qualitatively similar profiles are 
obtained by  analyzing mean and median savings, savings per household and 
per capita, and savings by pensioners and savings averaged across all house- 
holds. 
The American and the German age-wealth profiles are not consistent with 
the ones predicted by the pure life-cycle hypothesis. The upward swing in the 
German age profile of  savings rates is in straight contradiction to the predic- 
tions of the life-cycle hypothesis. In the United States, according to the PSID 
wealth data (table 8.10), the elderly aged 80 and above still hold  more than 
two-thirds of the maximum wealth attained immediately before retirement. 
Why do the elderly draw down so little of their financial assets at old ages, 
particularly in West Germany? One reason would be to leave bequests. If that 
were the case, the elderly with children  should, on average,  arrive at higher 
wealth levels than the elderly without  children-otherwise,  there would  be 
little reason to bequeath.I5 However, regressions of  nonhousing wealth on the 
number of  children born, holding age and income constant, produce positive 
coefficients neither in Germany nor in the United States.  I6 While the estimated 
negative coefficients are only weakly significant, they rule out the idea that a 
bequest motive has created the flat or increasing asset profiles in Germany. 
There is also little reason to suspect that precautionary savings generate the 
observed savings pattern in Germany. As I mentioned in the previous subsec- 
tion, the comprehensive coverage of  German health insurance  should permit 
the German elderly to draw down their assets, disregarding  potential health 
expenditures,  while  the  American  elderly,  on  average  much  less  covered, 
should have a stock of  precautionary liquid wealth. However, the opposite is 
the case: nonhousing assets increase with old age in West Germany, while they 
slightly decrease in the United States. Hence, it is unlikely that precautionary 
savings drive the pattern of  age-asset profiles in the two countries. 
Concerning the German sample, it also appears unlikely that mortality dif- 
ferences between the rich and the poor are behind the U-shaped age-savings 
profile. If the rich survive the poor and if saving is positively correlated with 
income,  sample  selection  generates  higher  savings  in  the  sample of  older 
people, unless income had concurrently fallen, which was not the case between 
1978 and  1983. Savings rates, however, should stay approximately  constant, 
because they hold income constant and therefore roughly correct for the sam- 
ple selection by  differential mortality. However, savings rates rise even faster 
15. One might also wish to leave bequests to persons or institutions other than one’s children, 
but the bequest motive appears strongest with respect to children. 
16. See Borsch-Supan (199  lb). I intentionally excluded housing wealth, because larger families 
have  larger houses that  have, on average, higher sales prices. Because mobility  is low among 
homeowners, many elderly who had  large families are still living  in their large houses, with or 
without a bequest motive. 
17. To  get the semantics straight: the point is not to test for the presence of a bequest motive 
per se, but to test whether a bequest motive is the source of the asset and savings profiles observed 
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than absolute savings (see tables  8.12 and 8.13). It is therefore unlikely that 
the observed patterns have been created by differential mortality between rich 
and poor elderly. 
I favor a different  interpretation of the data, one supported by  table 8.15. 
This table displays the relative frequency of elderly households with an excess 
of annuity income over consumption expenditures. This table points out that it 
is more helpful to investigate why the German elderly consume so little than 
to wonder why the German elderly  save so much. Annuity  income exceeds 
consumption  expenditures, and this happens increasingly  with  age. The de- 
cline in consumption expenditures is too large to be attributed merely to under- 
reporting: for about a quarter of the elderly aged 75 and above, annuity income 
is more than 50 percent higher than consumption expenditures. In fact, almost 
all of this decline can be attributed to a reduction in food, travel, and transpor- 
tation consumption, categories in which the marginal utility from consumption 
is very likely to decline in old age because of deteriorating health or increasing 
loneliness. It is important to note that in Germany the decline in food, travel, 
and  transportation  expenditures  is  not  offset  by  larger  health  expenditures 
since almost all of the (indeed increasing) health bills are covered by compul- 
sory health insurance, unlike in the United States. 
The wealth  pattern observed in table 8.10 is therefore consistent  with the 
view that the elderly in Germany find themselves saving out of  generous annu- 
ity income and not drawing down their existing wealth, as they might have 
planned before realizing their declining marginal utility from certain kinds of 
consumption. Moreover, since borrowing against social security wealth is im- 
possible, anticipation of declining expenditures may generate low levels of tan- 
gible wealth immediately before retirement but could not prevent asset accu- 
mulation once expenditures fall short of retirement income. 
8.4.3  Policy Implications 
A first, though tentative, conclusion  can be drawn about future aggregate 
savings as the German and the American  population  ages. It appears count- 
erfactual to employ asset profiles  drawn from a textbook version  of  the life- 
cycle hypothesis in order to forecast lower future wealth levels in Germany 
and, to a lesser degree, in the United States. Decreases in savings in the United 
States and Germany may be less dramatic than projected  by Auerbach et al. 
(1990) or may not occur at all. The high savings rates and the associated large 
asset holdings  among the elderly in Germany are more likely to lead to an 
increase in aggregate savings, at least during the medium-run transition period 
in  the  next  30 years  when  the  baby-boom  generation  becomes aged. One 
should be careful not to exaggerate the dread of  lower capital intensity due to 
population aging and a need to borrow at the expense of worsening the terms 
of trade. Whether aggregate savings will be lower or higher in the long-run, 
when the bulge of the baby-boom generation has disappeared and new cohorts 
with potentially very different savings attitudes are present, is impossible to 
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Table 8.15  Elderly with Expenditures Lower than Annuity Income (% of elderly 
in age group) 
Ratio of Annuity Income to Consumption Expenditures 
Age Group  <1.0  1 .o-1.2  1.2-1.5  >IS 
50-54  97.7  I .5  0.5  0.3 
55-59  92.0  3.9  2.9  1.2 
60-64  69.3  13.4  11.4  5.9 
65-69  47.3  23.5  18.0  11.2 
70-74  42.9  22.7  20.6  13.8 
15-79  38.1  19.2  21.6  21.1 
80+  30.5  17.3  23.2  29.0 
Source: EVS tapes (Stuttgart: Statistisches Bundesamt,  1983), based  on 18,259 elderly age 50 
and above. 
Notes: Annuity income includes public and private pensions, payments from life insurance, and 
private transfers. 
Second,  the  cross-sectional  evidence  is  consistent  with  the  so-called 
Feldstein view that social security wealth replaces private savings. Although 
aggregate savings are higher in West Germany, this is due to higher annuity 
wealth, while the average tangible wealth held by elderly German households 
is actually lower than in the United States. 
Moreover, the evidence is consistent with the view that the elderly reduce 
their consumption  because  of  declining health and that the German elderly, 
endowed  with generous  social  security benefits, even realize  savings which 
may have been unintended  when they were younger and against which they 
cannot borrow. 
This raises several welfare issues. There is the question of whether the el- 
derly are “overannuitized,” specifically in Germany. Evidence that the level of 
annuity income for the oldest old is, on average, considerably larger than their 
expenditures has strong implications for social security reform. Notwithstand- 
ing the need to prevent poverty among some of the elderly, it may be reasonable 
to tax wealth more heavily or to adjust annuity incomes more than the recent 
social security reforms did. Such an argument must be judged in light of the 
above-mentioned projections that social security contribution rates will exceed 
an unsustainable 40 percent in Germany when the dependency ratio peaks. 
Finally, there is little evidence for a bequest-motive-driven increase in sav- 
ings during old age. Although bequest volumes are relatively large-about  1.8 
percent  of  GDP in the United States (Kotlikoff  and  Summers 1981) and  3 
percent of GDP in France (Kessler 1990)-the  bulk of this appears to be unin- 
tended bequests. The efficiency arguments against taxing bequests-distorting 
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8.5  Housing and Living Arrangement Choices 
8.5.1  Institutional Background 
Policy  intervention in housing markets is intense both in Germany and in 
the United States. Subsidies and regulations strongly distort tenure choice, mo- 
bility, and living arrangement decisions in the two countries. However, the ac- 
tual subsidies and regulations are quite different. Once again, an international 
perspective illuminates how public policy influences actual behavior. 
In the United States, most housing subsidies are directed to home owner- 
ship, while subsidies in Germany  are directed  toward  rental housing  (Mayo 
and Barnbrock  1985). Both countries subsidize homeownership by deductions 
from income taxes. In the United States, mortgage interest for the purchase of 
a home and land can be deducted without any upper limit, thereby changing the 
marginal price of housing and inducing more housing consumption in terms of 
land, dwelling space, and housing quality. In Germany, mortgage interest is not 
deductible for owner-occupied homes. Rather, depreciation of the dwelling can 
be deducted  as a fixed percentage  of dwelling value, up to a limit which is 
slightly  lower than the average dwelling value in Germany. Hence, the mar- 
ginal price of housing is lowered only for relatively small houses. Land, which 
is a much  larger percentage  of  total purchase price in  Germany than in the 
United States, is not subsidized at all. For middle-class households and a typi- 
cal home in 1985, homeownership subsidies were approximately 2.5 to 3 times 
higher in the United States than in Germany (Borsch-Supan  1985, tables 3-6). 
Rental housing subsidies in the United States are typically directed to low- 
income  families, while  the  rental  allowances  in  Germany  are administered 
as entitlements. Traditionally, most older people were eligible for housing as- 
sistance, which  covered, on average, 23 percent of  rent  in  1985 (Mayo and 
Barnbrock  1985). Since mobility  in  rental  housing  is  much  higher  than  in 
owner-occupied housing, largely because of much higher transaction costs, the 
subsidies  in  the  United  States not  only distort  tenure  choice  but  indirectly 
reduce mobility and may therefore create lock-in effects for the elderly. 
Differences in rental housing regulations between the two countries are also 
important. Germany  has very  stringent tenant protection  laws. While initial 
rents are essentially unrestricted,  later rent increases  are bound  by  an index 
that  considerably  lags  the spot-market  level,  preventing  fast  rent  increases 
when land and house values appreciate quickly. Eviction is generally not per- 
mitted. In the United States, only very few cities have rental housing regula- 
tions; the most notable is New York. These rules make rental housing relatively 
more attractive in Germany than in the United States, and they are likely to 
discourage housing mobility, particular for the elderly who typically have par- 
ticularly long tenure and therefore high tenure discounts. 
The financial and regulatory incentives which reduce mobility in West Ger- 
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more expensive) than those the elderly would choose in an undistorted housing 
market. At the same time, the housing market distortions in Germany make it 
more difficult for younger households to buy larger housing  units (Behring, 
Borsch-Supan, and Goldrian 1988). 
Another  major institutional  difference  between  Germany  and  the  United 
States that is likely  to distort housing  and living arrangement choices is the 
already-mentioned extent of  compulsory health insurance. In Germany, com- 
pulsory health insurance includes coverage for long-term hospital care, while 
there is virtually no compensation for in-home care of elderly parents.I8 Until 
recently, hospitals had an excess supply of  beds, and the elderly used to stay 
for extended periods in hospitals. Public health insurance has no preset limit 
on the length of  hospital stays to be covered, as long as a hospital doctor ap- 
proves the stay. In the United States, hospital and nursing home bills not cov- 
ered by health insurance may force the elderly to leave hospitals and nursing 
homes early and to stay with their children. 
Health-care coverage, public subsidies which reduce rental housing costs 
for the elderly, and the  generally tighter social safety  net for the  elderly in 
West Germany represent economic disincentives for family support and shared 
living arrangements as compared to the United States. 
8.5.2  Evidence on Housing and Living Arrangement Choices 
The institutional differences between  Germany and the United  States are 
indeed reflected in the differences in housing and living arrangement choices. 
Consider first the choice of  tenure.  Table 8.16 presents ownership rates and 
average relative shares of housing and nonhousing assets for the elderly in the 
two countries. The elderly in West Germany are much more likely to live in 
rental housing than the elderly in the United States. While in the United States 
roughly 70 percent of  the elderly own their own homes, less than half the el- 
derly do so in West Germany. In both countries, ownership rates peak at ages 
55-59  and decline thereafter. The decline of homeownership is, of course, re- 
flected in the increasing share of nonhousing assets in total wealth among the 
elderly. In spite of  lower ownership rates, the average share of housing assets 
is quite high  in Germany, because the relative price of  housing  and land is 
substantially higher in Germany than in the United States. 
Another important housing policy difference mentioned above is the tenant 
protection  regulations in West Germany, which  are much tighter than in the 
United States. They are indeed mobility deterring, as can be seen from table 
8.17, which  presents  mobility  rates  in  the  two countries.  Mobility  is much 
higher in the United States for all age groups, but particularly for the elderly 
aged 70 and above, who have mobility rates about five times higher than their 
German counterparts. The very large number of moves among the elderly aged 
18. German income tax provides a tax deduction of just DM 1,800  (roughly $1,100) in this case. 316  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 8.16  Ownership Rates and Shares of Housing and Nonhousing Assets 
United States  West Germany 
Housing 
Age  Ownership Rate (%)  Wealth Share ('36) 
50-54  75.8  63.4 
55-59  76.0  61.2 
60-64  73.5  58.4 
65-69  69.2  55.5 
70-74  64.8  50.1 
75-79  68.4  53.1 
80+  62.4  46.2 
Housing 
Wealth Share (8)  Ownership Rate (%) 
56.3  73.3 
60.8  59.3 
53.7  56.5 
49.2  51.3 
41.7  67.1 
46.7  48.3 
40.8  49.0 
Sources; 1984 PSID; 1984 and 1988 SOEP. 
Note: Housing wealth is a self-reported estimate of  the sales price of an owner-occupied home 
Table 8.17  Mobility Rates and Housing Consumption Adjustments 
United States  West Germany 
Dwelling Size  Dwelling Size 
Mobility  Mobility 
Age  Rate (Yo)  Mover  Nonmover  Rate (%)  Mover  No  n m  o  v  e  r 
50-54  10.6  3.8  5.0  2.6 
55-59  10.2  3.2  4.8  2.0 
60-64  9.4  2.7  4.5  2.5 
65-69  6.9  3.3  4.2  2.8 
70-74  9.1  3.0  4.1  1.8 
75-79  4.8  3.3  3.9  1.1 
80+  15.4  2.7  4.0  1.3 
2.8  3.7 
Sources: 1984 PSID; 1984 SOEP. 
Note: Mobility  rate is the percentage of  movers, i.e., households who moved within the last  12 
months since being interviewed. Dwelling size is number of rooms excluding kitchen, bathrooms, 
and rooms smaller than 6 square meters (about 60 square feet). 
80 and above in the United States are moves to family members, particularly 
to their own adult children. 
Moves among the elderly, when they occur, release housing for the younger 
generation, as can be seen in the other columns of  table 8.17. On average, in 
both countries, recent movers have about one room less than nonmo~ers.'~  This 
result is in line with panel data observations (Venti and Wise 1990; Feldstein 
and McFadden  1988). 
However, though movers reduce dwelling  size in both countries, there are 
just too few moves in Germany to have an impact on dwelling size consump- 
19. It should be noted that the observed reduction in dwelling size does not, at least on average, 
imply a reduction in housing equity among elderly American homeowners when they move (Venti 
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tion. This is in line with the speculation that the mobility-reducing regulations 
in Germany have, in effect, reduced dwelling size adjustments among the aged. 
Indeed, table 8.18  shows that,  although  Germans have  smaller houses  than 
Americans when they are aged 50 and younger, this difference levels out when 
they become aged. 
The decline in housing consumption with age is much more pronounced in 
the  United  States than in West Germany.  In particular, there  is little if  any 
reduction of dwelling size among German homeowners as they age. 
Per capita housing consumption increases in both countries, a consequence 
of the decreasing average household size. In the United States, this increase is 
partially offset by  moves to smaller dwellings, in contrast to Germany where 
low mobility implies a much steeper increase of per capita dwelling size con- 
sumption. 
So far we have relied on cross-sectional evidence. In both countries, housing 
consumption  declines very little as households age. In fact, longitudinal data 
show strong cohort effects: for a given age, later birth cohorts show an increase 
in housing consumption. Table 8.19 presents the German case. The bottom row 
represents the average floor-space consumption of a panel of households in the 
SOEP in the five years from 1983 through 1988. The lack of change replicates 
the result that German households, on average, do not decrease their housing 
consumption as they age. However, by comparing different cohorts at the same 
age-i.e.,  by  comparing the entries  on  the  seven diagonals  for each of  the 
seven age groups-we  see that  succeeding cohorts  increased  their housing 
consumption. The right-most column depicts the range of standard deviations 
for each age group. The cohort effects for the 55-75-year-old  households are 
significant even though the households  were traced within only a short five- 
year span of the German panel data. 
I now turn to the evidence on living arrangement choices. I cast living ar- 
rangements into four categories. An elderly person lives “independently” if no 
Table 8.18  Housing Consumption (number of rooms) 
~~ 
United States  West Germany 
Age  Owners  Renters  Per Capita  Owners  Renters  Per Capita 
50-54  5.2  3.7  1.9  4.6  3.4  1.6 
55-59  5.0  3.3  2.0  4.6  3.3  1.7 
60-64  4.8  3.1  2.1  4.5  2.9  2.1 
65-69  4.6  2.9  2.2  4.2  2.8  2.3 
70-74  4.6  2.7  2.3  4.2  2.6  2.2 
75-79  4.4  2.7  2.3  4.1  2.5  2.2 
so+  4.5  2.3  2.4  4.5  2.5  2.4 
~~  ~ 
Sources: 1984 PSID; 1984 SOEP. 
Nore: Number of  rooms excludes kitchen, bathrooms, and rooms smaller than 6 square meters 
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Table 8.19  Age and Cohort Effects in Housing Consumption (dwelling size, area 
in square meters) 
Survey Year 
















19  19-23 
1918-22 
191  7-2  1 
I9 16-20 
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I9 14-1 8 
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other person lives in the household, except a spouse and minor children, and 
in “shared living arrangements” if at least one other person lives in the house- 
hold, most frequently an adult child. For independent living arrangements, we 
distinguish the cases of a spouse present and absent. For shared living arrange- 
ments, we differentiate between “head” and “taken-in.” In  the first case, the 
elderly person is the head of  household, while in the second case somebody 
else is head of household. Most frequently, an adult child has taken her or his 
parent in. Table 8.20 shows how frequently the different living arrangements 
were chosen by the elderly in the United States and West Germany, based again 
on comparable survey data from the PSID and the SOEP. 
The most significant difference in living arrangement choices between the 
two countries is in the percentage of  shared living arrangements. It is much 
higher in the United States. Almost one-third of  the very old live with their 
adult children or others. This fraction is only one-fifth in Germany. Note that 
the percentage living alone is about comparable for the elderly aged 65 and 
above, while  the  percentage  living  as couples  is substantially  lower  in  the 
United States. This is a reflection of the much higher incidence of divorces in 
the United States. In  1986, the United States had about 22 divorces per 10,000 
married women, West Germany only 8.3. Consequently, U.S. marital rates are 
about  10-12  percent  lower than  in  West  Germany for elderly aged 65 and 
above. 
The data in both countries do not produce reliable estimates of institutional- 
ization. They have thus been omitted from table 8.20. The PSID attempts to 
keep track of institutionalized sample persons with less than perfect success 
(Borsch-Supan 1990; Ellwood and Kane 1990). The SOEP starts in 1984 with 
a noninstitutionalized sample and therefore underestimates the percentage of 
elderly living in nursing homes. If at all, these panel studies reveal a decreasing 
Table 8.20  Living Arrangements of the Elderly (% of elderly population) 
~ 
United States  West Germany 
Independent  Shared  Independent  Shared 
Age  Couple  Alone  Head  Taken-In  Couple  Alone  Head  Taken-In 
50-54  55.3  14.2  17.6  12.2  82.2  7.9  7.3  2.6 
55-59  58.3  16.9  13.8  10.1  82.9  8.5  7.2  I .4 
60-64  51.2  20.1  18.6  9.4  77.4  14.3  5.9  2.4 
65-69  48.7  25.5  14.3  11.2  67.8  22.1  6.4  3.7 
70-74  44.0  33.3  12.0  8.8  57.3  34.5  5.1  3.1 
75-79  38.5  40.3  9.5  11.3  45.0  44.6  3.8  6.7 
80+  18.6  46.6  9.0  23.5  31.4  47.8  4.8  16.0 
Sources: 1984 PSID; 1988 SOEP. 
Nores; Independent (Couple): No other adult except spouse in household. Independent (Alone): 
No other adult in household. Shared (Head): Elderly is head of  household that contains another 
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proportion of elderly living with adult children and an increasing proportion 
living alone or in institutions (Borsch-Supan  1990; Ellwood and Kane 1990). 
A similar trend is observed in the German SOEP panel for the choice be- 
tween living alone and living with children; see table 8.21, set up in a fashion 
similar to table  8.19 on housing  consumption. The longitudinal  data reveal 
three effects. Going down each column, the pure age effect mirrors table 8.20 
and shows the familiar fact that the proportion of elderly living with children 
increases with age. However, this effect is more than offset by a strong cohort 
effect. This effect is visible by following each diagonal, holding age constant. 
Younger German cohorts are much less inclined to live with their children than 
were the older ones. These cohort effects are statistically highly significant and 
dominate the aggregate effect in the bottom row of table 8.21: the proportion 
of the elderly in the SOEP survey who live in with their children decreases 
from 1984 to 1988. 
8.5.3  Policy Implications 
The different  housing  market  policies  in  West  Germany  and the  United 
States have the predicted impacts: higher homeownership rates in the United 
States, dramatically lower mobility rates and a lower proportion of shared liv- 
ing arrangements in West Germany. While it would be unreasonable  to attri- 
bute all differences in observed housing and living arrangement choices by the 
elderly to the different housing market policies, the consistency of responses 
is striking. 
Having realized the effectiveness of  housing market policies, we should ask 
ourselves whether these policies make sense when the population is aging rap- 
idly. I recognize several problems here. First, housing supply by  intergenera- 
tional transfer is impeded because of the suppressed mobility of the elderly. 
Second, supply by new construction is distorted in the direction of too few, too 
large houses.  Third, there are too few  incentives, and even  some economic 
disincentives, for family care and multigenerational living arrangements. The 
first point is caused by the homeownership subsidies in the United States and 
by the tenant protection legislation in West Germany. The second point relates 
mostly to the United States, again because of homeownership subsidies, while 
the third point is most relevant in West Germany with its compulsory health 
insurance system. In the following, I will comment on these points in more 
detail. 
A first problem is that the elderly who consider moving into a smaller dwell- 
ing are discouraged to do so in both countries. In the United States, there is 
little incentive to give up valuable tax deductions unless reductions in dwelling 
size are compensated by quality improvements in dimensions other than size. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that the United States offers little at- 
tractive apartment housing for rent since the tax laws split the tenure choice 
along income lines, creating the well-known external effects that make rental 
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Table 8.21  Age and Cohort Effects in the Living Arrangement Choice 
(proportion of persons living in multigenerational households) 
Survey Year 
Cohort  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  Age  StandardDeviation 
19 19-23 
I9 17-2  1 
1915-19 
19  14-1 8 
19 13-1 7 
1  9  1 2-1  6 
191  1-15 
1910-14 












190  1-05 




















7.54  5.95  5.20  4.83  4.72  65+  0.76 
~ 
Source  SOEP, waves 1984-88,  persons aged 65+ 
Note  Multigenerational households are composite households consisting of  elderly parents and 
their adult children 
In West Germany, where many more elderly live in rental housing, the rent 
adjustment provision  of the tenant protection  laws supports high initial rents 
for movers and large discounts for sitting tenants, so-called tenure discounts, 
creating windfall gains for the older and a large rental burden for the young. 
The size of the wedge between rents for flow and rents for stock supply appears 
inefficient, and a smoother adaptation of rents in times of  demand pressures 
would be welfare improving. Let me stress that, if the elderly want to stay, they 
should do so. My point is that the numbers in table 8.17 indicate that there are 
elderly who would adjust their housing consumption downward were it not for 
the penalty of a large rent increase. 
Homeownership subsidies in the United States and rent adjustment provis- 
ions in West Germany also distort the supply of new housing. By lowering the 
marginal price of land and dwellings, the tax deductions in the United States 
channel resources  to large houses where the marginal room has little utility, 
thereby  suppressing the supply of  a larger number of  smaller houses, which 322  Axel Borsch-Supan 
appears to be more appropriate in times of population aging. In West Germany, 
the rent adjustment clause, if binding, lowers expected returns of a prospective 
landlord and therefore reduces supply. The argument, however, is quite subtle, 
because not all of the wedge between spot market and long-term rent must be 
inefficient. Tenure discounts may be an efficient way to minimize maintenance 
and revolving  costs in a manner similar to that in  which  seniority payments 
create efficient wage schedules.  Since tenure discounts are also observed in 
completely unregulated markets, one may argue that the German rent adjust- 
ment provision is not binding and can be dropped without harm. This may be 
true in the steady state. However, the policy dilemma starts when increases in 
demand raise spot market rents. Now the rent adjustment provision becomes 
binding and suppresses supply at the expense of  the newcomers, while pro- 
tecting sitting tenants (and providing windfall gains to them). Population aging 
is an example where this is the case.*O 
Mobility-reducing policies impede the intergenerational transfer of housing, 
which represents an important mechanism of housing supply. Direct transfer 
alone-homes  that are inherited-amounts  to 28 percent of all owned homes 
in Germany.*’ Indirect transfer is much more common: in 1983, about 74 per- 
cent of all recent home buyers purchased existing homes in the United States. 
This percentage increased steadily to over 80 percent in 1989 (Statistical Ab- 
stract, various issues). Population  aging implies  a longer  stay in the family 
home by the older generation, which leads to a relative shortage of housing for 
the younger generation. 
The magnitude of this longevity-induced shortage effect is substantial, as is 
evident from the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. The current co- 
hort  of  elderly  aged  80 comprises about  350,000 persons in approximately 
250,000 households. If a one-year increase in life expectancy implies that this 
cohort will stay one year longer in their current dwellings, an increased hous- 
ing demand of 250,000 units is generated. Since average life expectancy has 
increased by  1.3 years in West Germany from 1981 to 1986, the annual addi- 
tional demand due to population aging amounts to 65,000 dwelling units. This 
is about 28 percent of all new construction in  1986.22 
In Germany, the prolonged duration of more elderly in their homes is un- 
likely to be offset by a decreasing demand of the younger generation. Hence, 
German housing markets will stay tight for the near future, unless more down- 
grading of dwelling size in old age and faster new construction is forcefully 
encouraged. Since population aging is slower in the United States and housing 
20. It is important to stress that tenant protection per se-the  prohibition of  eviction and rent 
increases beyond market rents-is  a social achievement particularly important for the elderly, who 
face higher psychic, and sometimes monetary, moving costs. 
21. Computed from the 1988 wave of the SOEP. 
22. In  1986, 225,000 dwelling units  were constructed in  West Germany (Statistisches Jahr- 
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markets there are currently not as tight as in Germany, similar problems are 
less pronounced in the United States. 
Another  area  in  which  we  identified  distortions  are  living  arrangement 
choices. In the United States, the extent  of  family care appears to be much 
higher than in West Germany, although the trend is in direction of a decreasing 
proportion  of elderly living with adult children and an increasing proportion 
living alone and in institutions. Since living alone and living in an institution 
incur much higher social costs (induced health  expenditures,  stationary  and 
ambulatory  services for the elderly, etc.) than  living with  others, it appears 
wise to intercept some of  the external effects by subsidizing home care. The 
case is strongest in West  Germany, where current health  insurance policies 
create an additional distortion by effectively subsidizing living alone. 
If  the current proportions of living arrangements are not reversing, the de- 
mand for social support services such as ambulatory care will increase dramat- 
ically. For the low-income elderly, the associated expenses have to be borne by 
welfare programs financed by general taxes. They are thus subject to the famil- 
iar problems of pay-as-you-go social insurance schemes in times of increasing 
dependency ratios. 
8.6  Summary and Conclusions 
What do we learn from a microeconomic, cross-national analysis about the 
interrelation between economic policy and population aging? A first and im- 
portant  point  is the effectiveness of economic policy. Retirement decisions, 
savings behavior, and housing and living arrangement choices are very consis- 
tent with the incentives provided by economic policy in form of  regulations, 
taxes, and subsidies in Germany and the United States. Examples are the re- 
sponse  of  retirement  dates  to pension  schedules,  the  consistency  of  cross- 
national differences in  savings with cross-national differences  in retirement 
income and health insurance provisions, and the reaction of  housing  choices 
and mobility to homeownership subsidies and rental regulations. 
Second, the analysis identifies several trouble spots where incentives set by 
economic policy work in the wrong direction in times of  population  aging. 
Germany has failed to respond quickly to the dangers of  unsustainably high 
social security contributions. This is particularly worrisome in the light of so- 
cial security benefits  which are so large in old  age that they  induce forced 
savings among the well-to-do elderly. The United States has adjusted its social 
security system relatively earlier in spite of  a less pronounced increase in the 
ratio of pensioners to workers. Both countries have fiscal disincentives for fam- 
ily care and multigenerational living arrangements. Providing positive incen- 
tives here could help to offset the shortage of  family care generated by  the 
demographics of a dwindling number of children per elderly. 324  Axel Borsch-Supan 
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Comment  N. Gregory Mankiw 
I learned a lot from reading  this paper by  Axel Borsch-Supan.  It presents  a 
large variety  of facts about the behavior of  the elderly in Germany and the 
United States as well as about some of the policies that influence that behavior. 
The facts are presented in the way that I like to consume them-simply,  with 
a minimum of econometric processing. 
In some ways, this is a hard paper to comment on. Borsch-Supan does not 
offer a single, grand theory that purports to explain all the differences between 
these two countries. In fact, he is so reserved in drawing conclusions, and so 
careful about presenting caveats, that there is little to argue about. So, in my 
comments, rather than being disagreeable, I would like to discuss those areas 
in which I see some important puzzles left unanswered. 
N. Gregory Mankiw is professor of economics at  Harvard University and a research associate 
of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 326  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Saving Behavior of the Elderly 
I would like to begin with a topic that has puzzled both  microeconomists 
and macroeconomists  for many years: the saving behavior of the elderly. It is 
now a well-known stylized fact that the elderly do not behave as Franco Mo- 
digliani said they should (Ando and Kennickell  1986). According to the life- 
cycle hypothesis, wealth should decline after retirement, and that just does not 
happen-at  least not as quickly as the most basic version of the theory pre- 
dicts. 
There are various explanations of this failure of the life-cycle hypothesis, 
but none seems fully satisfactory. These explanations can be grouped into two 
broad categories: those that allow the elderly to be rational and those that as- 
sume some element of irrationality. In the rational category, there are two can- 
didates. One is that the elderly have a bequest motive-altruistic,  strategic, or 
otherwise. The second is that the elderly hold onto their wealth for reasons 
of precautionary  saving-either  because of uninsurable medical expenses or 
because of uncertainty about life span. 
Both of  these rational explanations seem hard to square with the evidence. 
As Borsch-Supan notes, the elderly without children do not seem to obey the 
life-cycle hypothesis any more than those with children. Since children are the 
most likely beneficiaries of  a bequest motive, this fact casts doubt on the be- 
quest explanation.  The precautionary-saving  explanation  is hard to rule out 
with only U.S. data, but the German data seem move conclusive. According to 
Borsch-Supan, most of the risks that the US.  elderly face are absent in Ger- 
many. The comprehensive health insurance system should eliminate the worry 
about large medical bills, and the high level of annuity income should insure 
against the uncertainty regarding life span. Yet the elderly in Germany do not 
listen to Franco Modigliani  any more than  do those in the United  States. In 
fact, according to Borsch-Supan’s numbers, a majority of  the German elderly 
are consuming less than their annuity income; these elderly must be accumu- 
lating wealth rather than spending it. 
One is, therefore, tempted to explain the behavior of the elderly by appealing 
to some sort of irrationality. Yet even that is not so easy. One possibility is that 
the elderly have excessively optimistic expectations about their own life span: 
admittedly, it is hard to accept one’s own mortality. Such excessive optimism 
can explain lower consumption than is predicted by the life-cycle model with 
rational consumers. It cannot, however, explain consumption lower than annu- 
ity income. Even if  a person plans to live to age  150, he should consume at 
least his annuity, since the annuity will continue as long as he does. 
Borsch-Supan proposes another type of irrationality. Perhaps the elderly are 
excessively  optimistic  regarding  marginal  utility  rather  than  life  span. Ac- 
cording to Borsch-Supan, the elderly save in the expectation of enjoying con- 
sumption during retirement, but then, because of deteriorating health, they are 
systematically  surprised  that  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption  is  lower 
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I am not convinced by this story. Even if marginal utility does fall unexpect- 
edly, the elderly should still consume their wealth-after  all, you can’t take it 
with you. Sure, they will just enjoy the consumption less, but unless the mar- 
ginal utility  of consumption falls to zero, it is still in the elderly’s interest to 
spend their wealth as they age. 
In  the end, the  failure  of  the  elderly  to dissave  remains a  puzzle.  My 
own guess is that the resolution will come from a combination of  bequest and 
precautionary-saving  motives.  If  both  motives  are  relevant,  then  the  com- 
parison  between  the  elderly  with  children  and  those  without  children  is 
ambiguous. Having children raises the bequest motive, but it also reduces the 
precautionary-saving  motive,  because  children  provide  implicit  insurance. 
The best thing that can be  said about this explanation  is that it is logically 
consistent  and is not rejected  by  the data. As far as I know, however, there 
is no affirmative evidence to suggest that it is in fact the right explanation. 
Saving and the Aging of Society 
Let me now turn from the individual level to the societal level. In particular, 
how will the aging of  society influence national  saving? Borsch-Supan  sug- 
gests that, since the elderly do not dissave, we should not expect national sav- 
ing to fall as the elderly become a larger percentage  of the population. I am 
not so sure. 
There are two ways to examine the impact of demographic change on na- 
tional saving. One way  is to examine micro data on  the saving of individuals 
and then to aggregate to get national saving. This is the approach that Borsch- 
Supan implicitly takes. The second way is to examine macro data-that  is, to 
exploit the time-series and cross-country variation in demographic structure to 
examine how aging influences national saving. 
In his Harvard dissertation, David Weil compared these two approaches and 
showed that they lead to strikingly different conclusions. Micro data show little 
dissaving by the elderly. Yet macro data show that nations with a large elderly 
population tend to have low saving rates. 
Weil reconciles these two results by emphasizing the role of  bequests. The 
failure of the elderly to dissave implies, as a matter of  logic, that the elderly 
are dying with substantial wealth and thus leaving substantial bequests. Even 
if these bequests are accidental rather than the result of a bequest motive, they 
cannot be ignored, because somebody is receiving them. These recipients will 
presumably consume more in response. Thus, nations with a large elderly pop- 
ulation save less not necessarily because the elderly dissave, but perhaps be- 
cause the young consume more in response to the greater likelihood of receiv- 
ing a bequest. 
There are three  reasons  for believing  this mechanism is important.  First, 
there is  substantial evidence  (from  Kotlikoff  and Summers 1981, e.g.) that 
bequests are an important component of wealth accumulation, and it is hard to 
argue that those receiving the bequests should be unaffected by them. Second, 328  Axel Borsch-Supan 
there is the disparity between micro and macro data that Weil documents; I do 
not know of  any better way to explain it. Third, there is some direct evidence. 
In his dissertation, Weil examines the consumption of individuals in the PSID; 
he finds that those who have recently received a bequest, or say they expect to 
receive a bequest, tend to consume more than those without any prospect for 
receiving a bequest  (holding other things,  such as income, constant). More- 
over, the estimated magnitude of this effect is large enough to reconcile the 
micro and macro data. 
The bottom  line is that the aging  of  a society may well depress  national 
saving, but not for the reasons given by  the life-cycle model. Rather, as the 
elderly population grows and bequests become more common, the young may 
save less than they otherwise would. 
Social Security and the Disincentive to Work 
The last issue that I will address is the disincentive to work provided by the 
social security system. Borsch-Supan shows that this disincentive is substantial 
in both Germany and the United States. He suggests that it would be better if 
social  security were  “nondistortionary”-that  is, if  it  did  not  influence the 
work incentive of the elderly. 
Although  I am generally  sympathetic with this conclusion, I do have one 
reservation. It is my understanding  that the disincentive to work is a feature 
not only of the German and U.S. systems, but of the public pension system in 
almost every industrial society. As economists, we usually follow the method- 
ological precept that people do not systematically make mistakes. Similarly, if 
we observe some policy adopted in many countries, we might be tempted to 
think that there is some reason for it-maybe  even a good reason. 
In a recent paper, Xavier Sala-i-Martin has suggested that social security’s 
work disincentive may be optimal. He argues that, because of depreciation, the 
elderly have low levels of human capital. Moreover, in the spirit of some recent 
work on economic growth, he argues that there are externalities to the average 
level of  human capital. These two assumptions  naturally lead to the conclu- 
sions that the working elderly depress an economy’s productivity and that pub- 
lic policy should encourage the elderly to leave the labor force. 
Although Sala-i-Martin’s explanation of public pensions is ingenious, I am 
not persuaded by it, as I find it hard to believe that this externality is significant. 
Yet before I sign on with Borsch-Supan’s conclusion that we should move to a 
nondistortionary  system, I would like to see this issue addressed more fully. 
Perhaps the work disincentive is so universal because it is optimal. If it is not 
optimal, at least in  some second-best  sense, then  it is puzzling  that  it is so 
common. In the absence of any explanation of why social security systems so 
universally discourage the elderly from working, I am reticent to conclude that 
existing policies must be undesirable. 329  Aging in Germany and the US.:  International Comparisons 
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